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Analytic philosophy of perception of the last twenty or so years might reasonably be framed as a 
tug of war between two opposing theories - Representationalism (of various stripes) and Naïve 
Realism. A few dissenting voices come from the sidelines: that of the of the Sense Datum theorist 
(now usually empirically-informed), the adverbialist, and a number of pluralists calling ‘halt’.  The 
grammatical theorist, who had her heyday in Oxford in the 1950s, seems to have deserted the 
scene completely.  
 
This chapter is about one ‘grammatical theorist’ whose absence from the side-lines is, we think, a 
great loss to contemporary debates. Despite writing two ground-breaking papers on sensation,1 G. 
E. M. Anscombe is hardly ever reckoned to be a philosopher of perception at all. A cursory sample 
of any clutch of the most influential monographs in the philosophy of perception over the last 
forty years will show her barely referenced (of ten of those on our combined bookshelves – the 
reader is encouraged to check their own! - Anscombe is mentioned only twenty-one times; five 
references are in footnotes. Nine references appear in a single text: Howard Robinson’s Perception 
(1994)). In the recent Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception – all 907 pages of it – Anscombe is 
cited only twice, again, in footnotes.  
 
The (lack of) influence of Anscombe’s philosophy of perception stands in sharp contrast to her 
dominance in philosophy of action. Her masterpiece Intention has, at the time of writing, been cited 
over 5,000 times, and it is generally thought to provide the blueprint for the whole of that sub-
discipline. But even when influential attempts have been made to understand perception as a kind 
of action, Anscombe’s work has not been thought relevant. The broad consensus that perceiving 
is an activity has led few current philosophers of perception see the specifics of action theory as 
relevant to a philosophy of perception, at least in published work. Relatedly, until recently, 
questions proper to an ethics of perception have been rarely articulated - and if they have, they 
have been framed by moral theorists or philosophers of emotion anxious to pull the domain of 
value into the nexus of the perceivable, and not much by self-identified philosophers of 
perception.  
 
Here we focus only on making available some of the basic conceptual tools of Anscombe’s 
grammatical approach and on showing in what respects her procedure offers an alternative to the 
ontological approaches that still dominate the contemporary debate. Participants in the ‘tug of war’ 
are unified in their supposition that a theory of perception should tell us the fundamental nature 
of perceptual experience and, as part of that, what it is that we perceive. It is this supposition that 
Anscombe rejects and, as we explain, in doing so she reveals an ethical purpose for philosophy of 
perception.  
 
We begin by setting out a fragment of the theoretical background needed to understand 
Anscombe’s method in philosophy of perception before contrasting her grammatical procedure 
 
1 Hereafter ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’ will be referred to as IS. See also ‘The 
Subjectivity of Sensation’ (1976/1981a). 
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with the ontological procedure of her interlocutor. In later sections, we identify three mistakes that 
exegetes have made in approaching Anscombe’s philosophy of perception. These stem from 
failure to recognise the meaning and implications of Anscombe’s claim that the intentionality of 
sensation is, as she dubs it, ‘a grammatical feature’.  
 
Needless to say, the successful introduction of a new paradigm into philosophy of perception will 
require more space than a single chapter (see Fish, this volume). Readers should take this 
intervention as an encouragement to, and promise of, further work.  
 
 
§1. The raging nerve extracted  
 
Anscombe was animated by questions concerning a philosophy of perception from her earliest 
days as an undergraduate at Oxford in the late Thirties, long before she developed her interest in 
the philosophy of action. She attended H. H. Price’s lectures on perception, finding them 
‘absolutely about the stuff’ though she abhorred Price’s conclusions (‘I used to sit tearing my gown 
into little strips because I wanted to argue against so much that he said’).2 It is possible that such 
preoccupations made her peculiarly responsive to the force of Wittgenstein’s philosophy when she 
encountered it later as post-doctoral fellow in Cambridge. She recalls: 
 
 I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn’t see my way out of it but 
 I didn’t believe it….the central nerve of it remained alive and raged achingly. It was only 
 in Wittgenstein’s classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve extracted.3 
 
Those classes contained Wittgenstein’s discussions of material that would come to be known as 
the ‘private language argument’ and which surfaces in those passages in the Philosophical Investigations 
that get us to see how our psychological verbs function.4 Wittgenstein denies that to grasp the 
meaning of a psychological verb is to identify its referent – mental phenomena which, on empiricist 
model of concept acquisition, such terms might be thought to pick out. Rather it is to come to 
participate in forms of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour. He called these forms or practices 
- which involve the interweaving of words and action into recognised patterns of human 
interaction - ‘language-games’ and he seeks to describe them.  
 
In appealing to language games that involve psychological verbs and sensation words, Wittgenstein 
wants to get us to see that such words express concepts that have a different, more complex, 
character than that of a straightforward classificatory concept - a concept that picks out some class 
of things.5 This complexity, Wittgenstein thinks, is revealed in, and reflected by, the structure of 
the practices in which those verbs have their home. Thus, in contrast to the mistaken empiricist 
impulse to classification (which Anscombe characterises as: ‘I have got this, and I define “yellow” 
(say) as this’), participating in a linguistic practice involves far more than identifying an instance or 
token of a class or type. This is because it involves being acculturated – or trained, as Wittgenstein 
somewhat provocatively puts it – to continue in a way that is characteristic of the practice. It hence involves 
not only the use of words but forms of behaviour and interaction with others as well as with the 
natural and material environment. Since the intelligible use of a word is governed by the norms of 
such materially realised, temporally extended practices, sense or meaning cannot be privately 
established, even where the referents of terms used on occasion may be private, as when one is in 
pain.  
 
2 Anscombe 1981, viii. 
3 Ibid. 
4 For pertinent discussion of what ‘getting us to see’ amounts to, see McGinn (1997), esp. p. 116. 
5 For helpful discussion, see Frey and Frey 2017, p.217-219 
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Anscombe’s contention is that a central task for philosophers of perception is to undertake a 
‘grammatical investigation’. That is, to describe the structure of the concept of sensation, a structure 
that is revealed in the complex patterns of speech and action that manifest an individual’s grasp of 
the meaning of words like ‘see’, ‘colour’, ‘appearance’. If they were to turn their attention to that 
task, two things would follow. First, they would discover that the ontological debate that 
characterises the tug of war is ultimately misguided. Second, as we later explain, if briefly, the 
ethical dimension of our perceptual lives would come into view. 
 
 
§2.  What is an object of sight? 
 
To see what such a grammatical investigation might look like, we now turn Anscombe’s 
philosophy of perception proper. Anscombe’s central claim is one that will have a familiar ring to 
philosophers of perception: verbs of sensation take intentional objects. Like many theorists, she 
sees this claim as key to unlocking the relationship between the subjectivity of sensation and 
perception’s epistemic role.  
 
The category of ‘intentional object’ reflects Anscombe’s intellectual debt to the Thomist tradition,6 
and it is this phrase, and this heritage, that has seemed to some to place her philosophy of 
perception in the tradition associated with her fellow Thomist, Franz Brentano. But while Aquinas 
(and Aristotle) is indeed an unmistakable and important influence, her deployment of 
Wittgenstein’s method transforms Brentano’s notion of an intentional object into a grammatical 
category – a transformation this section of the chapter explains.7 The subtitle of her paper, ‘The 
Intentionality of Sensation’ is ‘A Grammatical Feature’: as we shall see, the switch from an 
ontological to a grammatical understanding of intentionality takes her away from any position 
which could be regarded as a forerunner of contemporary intentionalism.  
 
Anscombe’s grammatical procedure is evident from the outset: she sets about illuminating the 
status of an ‘object of sight’ not by reflecting on perceptual experience, but by examining the way 
a teacher might elicit understanding of the grammatical concept of a direct object in her pupils. 
She imagines the teacher proceeding as follows. The teacher gives her pupils a paradigm sentence: 
‘John sent Mary a book’. Then she asks them: ‘What does the sentence say John sent Mary?’ On 
the getting the pupils’ response ‘a book’, the teacher replies: ‘That is the direct object’.8 We might 
imagine the teacher giving a wide range of sample sentences and asking the same question in 
respect of each. The pupils ‘catch on’ to the grammatical concept of a direct object when they 
know how to go on – they return the correct answer in novel cases and are able to construct cases of 
their own.  
 
The understanding that the teacher elicits is, in an important sense, already manifest in the pupils’ 
ordinary linguistic practice. That the pupils are competent language-users, able to construct and 
employ sentences containing transitive verbs, is a pre-condition for her teaching. In that sense, the 
pupils already operate with the grammatical category, ‘direct object’. The teacher’s lesson makes 
explicit this understanding by introducing the term, ‘direct object’, and teaching them its use. Once 
they have mastered the use of this term, they can employ it to talk about features of their linguistic 
competence.  
 
6 For discussion of Anscombe’s Thomism in the context of her philosophy of action, see Schwenkler 2019, pp.157-
161 
7 See Poulvet 2008 and Geach 1957 for comparative discussions of Wittgenstein’s and Aquinas’ treatment of 
intentionality. 
8 See IS, pp. 6-9 
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We can see how different the character of the concept ‘direct object’ is from that of a classificatory 
concept (like ‘book’) by reflecting on the teachers’ procedure. In her lesson, the teacher draws 
attention to the relevant grammatical category by posing questions that require the pupils to reflect 
on the parts and structure of a familiar sentence. ‘What does the sentence say John sent Mary?’. 
The concept of a direct object is not, and could not, be ostensively taught: the teacher does not, 
that is, pick out things that form a class. One way to put this is to say that the word ‘That’ functions 
differently in the teacher’s response ‘That is the direct object’ than it would in an ostensive 
demonstration ‘That is a book’: only in the latter case is ‘that’ a referring expression. A pupil who 
raised the question, ‘Which book?’, would show that she had not understood this. This question 
lacks application because the response that gives the direct object – ‘a book’ – does not refer to a 
particular worldly book, but rather identifies a part of the sentence. But note too that although the 
term ‘direct object’ identifies a part of the sentence (viz. ‘a book’), it does not refer to the words ‘a 
book’ either (another kind of thing that could be picked out with the ostensive use of ‘That’). As 
Anscombe notes, it is not the case that the sentence says that John gave Mary a bit of language!   
 
In sum, direct objects are not things that we find in the world; rather, when we are talking about 
our talk about the world, we can pick out a certain structure or pattern in that talk by pointing out 
a particular way in which verbs are combined with other terms. It is here that the concept of a 
‘direct object’ is to be found, and this is what Anscombe means by calling it a ‘grammatical 
category’.9  
 
Anscombe’s profound challenge to both sets of participants in philosophy of perception’s tug of 
war is the following: each treats the concept of an object of sight as if it were a classificatory 
category. But for Anscombe, an object of sight is the direct object of the verb ‘to see’. As such, it 
too is a grammatical category. To get a sense of what she has in mind here we can imagine our 
teacher giving a lesson to teach her class the meaning of the phrase ‘object of sight’.  
 
Teacher: ‘Mary sees a book.’ What does the sentence say Mary saw?  
Pupil: A book.  
Teacher: That is the object of sight.  
 
The understanding that the teacher elicits is, once again, already manifest in her pupils’ ordinary 
linguistic practice; for example, to say what she sees and to ask another what they see. That the 
pupils are competent language-users, able to construct and employ sentences with the grammatical 
structure of ‘Mary sees a book’, is a pre-condition for her teaching. So, in this sense, the pupils 
already operate with the grammatical category, ‘object of sight’, before they are taught the use of 
that term. The teacher’s lesson, if it is successful, gives them a grammatical term, ‘object of sight’, 
which enables them to talk about the linguistic mastery they already possess. They can now not 
only talk about what they see but talk about their talk about what they see. 
 
Anscombe describes the use of ‘object’ as she means it here as the ‘old’ use, a use that nevertheless 
remains familiar in phrases such as ‘object of desire’. The ‘modern’ use, conversely, picks out 
objects of the sort that might find in a person’s pocket – worldly stuffs like pencils and keys. 
Anscombe’s old use of ‘object’ is however grammatical – an object of sight is the direct object of 
the sensation verb ‘to see’. Accordingly, the pupil who responds to the teacher’s questioning by 
casting around looking for the worldly book that Mary saw – an object in the ‘modern’ sense – has 
not grasped the fact that ‘object of sight’ is a grammatical category. For Anscombe, both the Direct 
Realist and her historical opponent, the Sense Datum theorist make a mistake akin to that of such 
 
9 Compare Frege on the concept ‘horse’; for discussion see Frey and Frey 2017, p.221-223 
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a child. In learning that the sentence says that Mary saw something and forgetting that ‘object of 
sight’ is grammatical category, they ask instead after what this something is that Mary saw, or what it 
is that she really saw. That is, they ask, ‘What did Mary see?’, and treat the answer as returning an 
object in the modern sense: a worldly entity or an entity of some other kind. Anscombe notes that 
this is bound to lead to philosophical confusion in cases of error, illusion or hallucination, where 
Mary’s answer to the question ‘What do you see?’ does not describe any thing in her vicinity.    
 
 
§3.  Anscombe’s procedure 
 
Suppose Anscombe were right in her claim that ‘object of sight’ is a grammatical, rather than a 
classificatory category. How should we then proceed in philosophy of perception? Above we 
emphasised that the teacher’s procedure works only for a pupil whose linguistic competence 
already involves mastery of the verb ‘to see’.  If Anscombe is right, it is then this very mastery that is 
the proper subject matter for philosophers of perception, and the term ‘object of sight’ is one of 
the lexical tools that the philosopher will use in her description of that mastery. Armed with the 
term ‘object of sight’ the philosopher of perception can now proceed to describe this linguistic 
competence by asking what patterns the verb ‘to see’ imposes on its (grammatical) objects. One 
line of investigation will ask which putative ‘x’ in sentences of the form ‘Mary sees x’ or ‘I see x’ 
are intelligible (what are the possible objects of sight). Another will investigate whether, where 
some ‘a’ is an object of sight, linguistic competence commits us to accepting other objects, ‘b’, ‘c’, 
‘d’. For example, whether ‘I see a rabbit’ commits a speaker to, e.g. ‘I see a mammal’, ‘I see a grey 
fluffy shape’, or ‘I see a living thing’ (what are the relations between objects of sight).10 The first 
line of investigations will draw the limits on what we see from within the linguistic practice; the 
second will reveal patterns of inference within the conception of sensation (its geometry).11 In 
short: the task for the philosopher of perception is not to describe the character of what we see, 
but to describe the character of our descriptions of what we see. That is, it is to describe the 
character of ‘objects of sight’.  
 
Because the notion of linguistic competence includes more than mere use of words – as noted 
above we are speaking here of language-games and not mere sentential structure – this 
investigation into patterns of intelligibility and inference will need to study words in use, and will 
not be limited to the question of whether a sentence is grammatically well-formed or felicitous. 
Analogously, a study of the concept length would encompass not just a study of well-formed 
sentence-types containing the word ‘length’ and its cognates, but also of the practices of measuring, 
estimating, building, etc., into which the use of those sentences is interwoven. It might be of 
interest to such a study to discover, for example, that the question ‘How long?’ can be intelligibly 
asked of a corpse but not of a living human adult.12  
 
To begin to see how such an investigation might proceed in relation to the verbs of perception, 
consider a non-perceptual transitive verb, ‘to donate’. There are conditions on the intelligible use 
of that verb that go beyond the simple sentential structure: subject, verb, object, object (e.g. ‘John 
donates food to the homeless’). For example: the subject must be sentient and capable of 
intentional action (a machine cannot donate its time to a cause, nor a germ its disease to a cat). To 
be a donor, one must also have an understanding of what is needed or wanted by those to whom 
one is donating. A monkey cannot donate its blood to medical science, nor a baby its rattle to a 
dog. This latter point brings into view constraints on intelligible objects of the verb ‘to donate’: a 
saucer of mud, a punch in the face or a toenail clipping cannot typically be donated – the verb’s 
 
10 Cf. Frey and Frey (2017) 
11 Compare, Intention. See Wiseman 2016, ch. 3 for a discussion of the form of philosophical enquiry in Intention.  
12 See Anscombe 1976/1981b, p. 117. 
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possible objects are limited to things wanted or needed. Here, further patterns and connections 
will come into view. These patterns and connections are part of what a person with linguistic 
competence knows – or part of what is encoded in the linguistic competence that is manifested in 
her participation in practices of giving and receiving. If I encounter you leaving vegetable peelings 
outside a fire station, your utterance ‘I am donating food to the homeless’, though well-formed, 
will suggest something awry.  
 
In ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, Anscombe makes a start on just this 
investigation. She observes that objects of the verb ‘to see’ display a pattern that is found elsewhere 
and which, in fact, is characteristic of a large class of psychological verbs. She draws our attention 
to this pattern by saying: the verb ‘to see’ is an intentional verb and takes an intentional object. 
Note again that ‘object’ here has its grammatical and not its ontological meaning, so, to emphasize, 
what is being said to be ‘intentional’ is not a class of things but a class of direct objects - here is a 
first move in a philosophical description of linguistic mastery, made by employing ‘direct object’ 
as a grammatical category. This is why Anscombe calls the intentionality of sensation ‘a 
grammatical feature’.  
 
The use of the word ‘intentional’ to describe this pattern is Anscombe’s stipulation, but she 
chooses it because the pattern displayed by (grammatical) objects of sight is also found in 
descriptions of intentional action. This might at first seem astonishing, but a little reflection reveals 
the source of the shared form.  
 
Anscombe notes things about descriptions of intentional actions: 
 
1.A Not any true description of what you do describes it as the action you intend: only 
under certain of its descriptions will it be intentional (“Do you mean to be using that pen?” 
– “Why, what about this pen?” – “It’s Smith’s pen.” – “Oh Lord, no!) 
 
2.A The descriptions under which you intend what you do can be vague and indeterminate. 
(You mean to put the book down on the table all right, and you do so, but you do not 
mean to put it down anywhere in particular on the table). 
 
3.A Descriptions under which you intend to do what you do may not come true, as when 
you make a slip of the tongue or pen. “You act, but your intended act does not happen”. 
 
These features are likewise broadly found in descriptions of what is seen (that is, are features of 
objects of sight):  
 
1.P Not any true description of what you see, is a description under which you see what is 
seen. (“See that man in the red coat? He’s the mayor” – “The mayor? I’d never have 
guessed!”  
 
2.P The descriptions under which you see something may be vague and indeterminate. (“I 
see a vase of flowers” – “How many flowers?” – “Loads! More than 20”  
 
3.P. Just as the action you intend to bring about may not occur, the object you see may 
not exist (the possible non-existence of the object is the analogue of the possible non-
occurrence of the intended action). (“I see pink elephants!”) 
 
The following case illustrates the presence of these features in descriptions of action and 
perception (adapted from IS, pp 9-10). 
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A hunter is hunting in a forest. Peering into the wood he says ‘I see a shadow moving in 
the trees!’. ‘What is it?’ asks his fellow hunter, ‘What can you see?’. ‘A stag!’, the hunter 
replies. He takes aim, and shoots. But what he saw was, in fact, his father out for a stroll 
in the forest. He shoots his father. Later, in a law court he says, weeping, ‘I saw my father’. 
His friend, called as witness, says, ‘He aimed and shot intentionally, and he did shoot his 
father. But he didn’t shoot his father intentionally – he never saw his father.’ 
 
It is true that the hunter saw his father, something he came to realise after the event and that he 
weepingly acknowledges in the law court. But while the description ‘his father’ was true of what 
he saw – what he saw was, in fact, his father – his first-person report ‘I see a stag’ is not untruthful. 
Indeed, it is the fact that he saw his father under the false description ‘stag’ that is explanatorily relevant: 
it explains why he took the shot.  
 
The vignette contains multiple intelligible uses of the sensation verb ‘to see’. Using the term ‘object 
of sight’, we can describe connections between these uses by describing relations between the 
objects of sight. Note, that these relations will not be relations between two distinct relata (like the 
relation between a table and a book), but rather logical or inferential relations between direct 
objects (like the relation between ‘a gift’ and ‘a book’ in ‘John gave Mary a book’). Let us see how. 
 
The object of sight in the initial statement ‘He sees a shadow moving in the trees’ is ‘a shadow 
moving in the trees’. This object is both the description under which the hunter sees (‘a shadow moving 
in the trees’ is a description that he would give of what he sees) and a true description of something 
that is there in the situation and which might be seen by others (there is, indeed, a shadow moving 
in the trees). Anscombe calls the first kind of object (one that gives the description under which what 
is seen is seen) an intentional object, and it is with respect to these objects that the pattern found in 
descriptions under which what is done is done is replicated. In ‘intentional object’, ‘object’ is used in 
its old, grammatical, use. She calls the second kind of object (one that is a true description of 
something there to be seen) a material object.  In ‘material object’, ‘object’ is used in its modern, 
ontological, use. So here, the intentional object, ‘a shadow moving in the trees’ is also a material 
object.  
 
The hunter’s tragic acknowledgement in the courthouse ‘I saw my father’ records what Anscombe 
calls a merely material use of the verb ‘to see’. Here, the description ‘my father’ is not an intentional 
object – the hunter did not see the shadow under that description – but is nevertheless a true 
description of what the hunter saw. Anscombe points out that whenever the verb ‘to see’ is 
employed with a merely material use (as giving an ‘object’ in the modern sense), it is always 
legitimate to ask: ‘What did you see in that you saw (e.g.) your father?’. For a merely material use 
of the verb ‘to see’ to be intelligible, there must be some answer to that question which gives an 
intentional object. (Note: the previous sentence is an example of the sort of description that will 
constitute a philosophy of perception, on Anscombe’s view).  
 
In contrast, the hunter’s first-person report, ‘I see a stag!’, gives the description under which he 
saw his father, and so ‘a stag’ is an intentional object. The tragedy of the case is that this intentional 
object was merely intentional, though the hunter took it to be also material.  
 
Anscombe’s vignette illustrates the three features which should be recognisable to any seer. Not 
any true description of what you see is a description under which you see it (P1). Like descriptions 
of intentional action, description of what is seen essentially evoke the point of view of the agent 
of subject. While I may be able to give many true descriptions of what you, in fact, see, only some 
of those are descriptions under which you see what is seen. ‘A man born in Liverpool’, ‘Your 
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father’, ‘A mammal weighing 80kg’ may be true descriptions of what the hunter in fact sees (they 
are all descriptions that are true of his father), but none gives the description under which he sees 
that which is, in fact, his father. Whether or not there were stags to be shot in the vicinity, there 
was no stag at the place at which the hunter took a stag to be: just as the action you intend to bring 
about may not occur, the (intentional) object of sight you see may not exist (P3). A cautious or 
more experienced hunter may have responded differently to his friend’s query. ‘I’m not sure, there 
is a moving shadow in the trees – but I can’t see more than that, perhaps there is something there’. 
The descriptions under which you see something may be vague and indeterminate (P2).  
 
What Anscombe is concerned to reveal is that the question ‘What do you see?’ has its life in the 
language-game that is characteristic of the verb ‘to see’, and is answered by giving a description of 
what one sees (an intentional object), something the story also illustrates. In the normal case, 
however, the description will be true of something there to be seen, and so will be a material, as 
well as an intentional, object. This second claim, about what is normal, is also a contribution to a 
philosophical understanding of perception, being as it is one part of a description of the mastery 
that is its topic. 
 
We can now state explicitly the mistake Anscombe diagnoses in the positions of her mid-century 
dialectical opponents, although, as we shall see, she characteristically concedes that both ‘have a 
great deal of point’ (IS, p.13). Both the Ordinary Language philosopher and the Sense-Datum 
Theorist, extract the question ‘What do you see?’ from the language-game in which it has its home 
(and which, for Anscombe, they should be seeking to describe), and treat it instead as a classificatory 
question that is to be answered by returning a type of entity.  
 
One way of putting the observation that the Ordinary Language Philosopher and Sense-Datum 
Theorist take the question to be ontological (albeit while glossing over important differences between 
them even with respect this) is as follows: both fail to recognise that in its primary use an answer 
to the question ‘What do you see?’ gives an intentional object, a (grammatical) object of the verb ‘to 
see’ that has the features described in (1.P) – (3.P). Failure to recognise this – a failure which 
extends to the Ordinary Language Philosopher despite his superficial methodological closeness to 
the grammatical theorist -  leads to a search for a kind of thing. Now a theorist’s sensitivity to, and 
concern for, the three features Anscombe notes will determine which species of ontological theory 
he is drawn to. The sense-datum theorist takes very seriously (1.P) – (3.P), and so refuses to identify 
‘what is seen’ with (what Anscombe calls) the material object. But without the grammatical 
category of an intentional object his only option is to reify intentional objects into descriptions of 
some other kind of thing – some thing that cannot but be there in the whole situation, whether or 
not that description matches anything that might be publicly seen. This is the role for sense data.  
 
The Ordinary Language Philosopher by contrast ignores or seeks to explain away (1.P) – (3.P), 
preferring instead to advert directly to the worldly objects that perceivers, when genuinely 
perceiving, confront. And this is why, according to Anscombe, though such a philosopher will 
recognise material uses of the verb to see – indeed, the method of such a philosopher is chart such 
uses - he will not allow intelligible uses of ‘see’ that are merely intentional, or even those uses that 
are intended to be material but miss their mark. On this view, the hunters use of ‘see’ in ‘I see a 
stag’ is faulty. Concomitantly, such a theorist may well insist that the hunter saw his father, tout 
court; the testimony of the hunter’s friend must be dismissed, as well as that of the hunter. We will 
see the difficulty for this position shortly. To close this section, we circle back to the thought that, 
if the exposition we have offered is broadly right, Anscombe should in no way be counted as a 
forerunner to contemporary representationalism. 
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Representationalism is an ontological theory of perception – it tells us that what is seen are 
represented properties, features, relations, perhaps under certain manners or modes of 
presentation, which may or may not be instantiated.  That Anscombe supposes there is an 
intelligible use of the verb ‘see’ where the application is merely intentional – the use is not intended 
to give a material object of sight, an object that could in principle be available for others to see at 
a sensory context – implies nothing about what she takes the nature of hallucinatory (and 
concomitantly perceptual states) to be. She offers no positive ontology of perception; this is not 
what she is up to.  
 
 
§4. Two ontological errors in brief 
 
Anscombe’s position is, undoubtedly, subtle and complex. The unfamiliarity of the grammatical 
register of Anscombe’s philosophy of perception – contemporary philosophers without a 
background knowledge of Wittgenstein’s later work will find her moves neither natural nor logical 
– has led to a number of interconnected exegetical errors. These errors have combined to prevent 
subsequent philosophers of perception from recognising the significance of her intervention. We 
gloss two errors here, picking up the third in §5 before closing. 
 
The first error can be quickly stated. A failure to recognise that ‘object of sight’ is a grammatical, 
rather than ontological, category for Anscombe may prompt questions about the mode of 
existence and relations between intentional and material objects of sight, as well as about the 
identity conditions of the former. What are the identity conditions for intentional objects? What 
are the modes of existence of intentional and material objects? In what relations do material and 
intentional objects stand?  
 
For Anscombe, the questions like ‘When is object a the same as object b?’ will be answered by a 
very different procedure depending on whether ‘object’ is used in its old or modern sense, and in 
some cases, attention to the linguistic practice that the philosopher of perception seeks to describe 
will show why the demand for an answer is misplaced.13  Take the question ‘What are the identity 
conditions for intentional objects?’ There are, notes Anscombe, cases in which questions 
concerning the identity of an intentional object have ‘some interest’ – and note these questions are 
questions of practical and not philosophical interest to people engaged in language-games 
characteristic of our everyday commerce with the verbs of perception. Where the intentional 
object is also a material object, questions of the identity of the former are usually taken as questions 
of the identity of the latter: if you see your father (intentional object) and I see my boss (intentional 
object), the question of the identity of those objects reduces to the question of whether your father 
(material object) is my boss (material object). The question of the identity of intentional objects 
takes on a less prosaic form in areas of linguistic practice where, even in the presence of a shared 
material object, the reduction is ruled inappropriate. For example, if you and I are looking at 
 
13 Johnson (2004) makes such a demand. He finds Anscombe’s notion of intentional object ‘perfectly harmless’ – he 
sees that it does not turn direct objects into things. Yet he also says it is ‘jejune’ because it fails for him to meet what 
he takes to be a primary explanatory task for a philosophy of perception. He writes: ‘Anscombe offers us no way of 
making sense of non-trivial claims of identity of intentional objects across [perceptual] reports.’ It is not clear what 
non-trivial might mean in this context though it is plain that Johnston is looking for something more substantive than 
‘that is just how our language goes’. This suspicion is raised by the peculiar charge he raises against Anscombe. 
Johnston is taken by the familiar theoretical thought that hypothetical experiential transitions between hallucinatory 
and veridical states could be ‘seamless’.  This raises epistemic questions – how can I know if I am now hallucinating 
or now genuinely perceiving? But Johnston’s problem is different. He wants to tell us in virtue of what it is that such 
transitions are seamless – what makes them so. Granted we may be apt to offer the same perceptual report with the 
same intended use in both cases, but, asks Johnston, what makes that so much as possible? This, he thinks, is what 
Anscombe’s grammatical account cannot give us. And he is right. Anscombe’s project is not ontological. 
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together at a painting that strikes me as naïve and gauche and you remark ‘I see echoes of German 
Expressionism in this work’, I might ask, shocked: are we seeing the same thing? Is your visual 
impression very different to mine? Are you are colour-blind, or wearing the wrong glasses, or not 
really looking? Or, to give another example, I might wonder on looking again at my lover after 
discovering his infidelity whether I any longer see the same face: his visage always struck me as 
innocently beautiful but now I see his shifty expression and his arrogant gaze. In cases where we 
both see a pink elephant (intentional object) when no pink elephant (material object) is there to be 
seen, our ordinary linguistic practice offers a number of procedures for deciding whether we see 
‘the same’ (causal, phenomenological, counterfactual) but the question is ultimately left open by 
the practice. 
 
A second way in which the failure to take on board the grammatical character of Anscombe’s 
investigation reveals itself, is in a lack of sensitivity to the importance of the first-personal character 
of perceptual reports in Anscombe’s methodology. This reveals itself, for example, where 
Anscombe’s position is reconstructed using only the third person pronoun, as is relatively common 
in brief expositions of Anscombe’s position, or, relatedly, without due notice of the role of the 
interrogative mode (‘What do you see?’) in identifying objects of sight. For Anscombe, the question 
‘What do you see?’ and its answer ‘I see x’ are essential parts of the exposition of the grammatical 
category ‘object of sight’; and a description of the formal character of this exchange is a central 
goal for a philosophy of perception.14  
 
 
§5. Anscombe’s Purpose 
 
Earlier in the paper, we outlined the background to Anscombe’s procedure. In this section we discuss 
Anscombe’s purpose by bringing her into fleeting dialogue with the disjunctivist, and concomitantly 
a third exegetical mistake. Our discussion will be necessarily brief, but it aims to highlight the 
richness of what Anscombe’s philosophy of perception offers. 
 
Recall, 3.P says that just as the action you intend to bring about may not occur, the object you see 
may not exist. This, however, is something that the disjunctivist denies – in cases where the object 
does not exist, he says, you only ‘seem’ to see an object (or some other such locution). For him, 
cases of the kind in 3.P. are the ‘bad cases’ and involve error and illusion. Disjunctivism, as such 
and broadly speaking, has at its centre an epistemic notion of the ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of 
perceptual experience. A good experience involves acquaintance with that which can be 
represented, truly or falsely. A bad experience forecloses such acquaintance.  
 
Adopting Anscombe’s grammatical procedure, we can now allow that the question of whether a 
case falling under (3.P.) is a bad case is sensitive to the actual circumstances in which the perceptual 
episode takes place, circumstances that include facts about the perceiver and her intentions. 
Similarly, the question of whether a case in which the intentional object is a material object is a 
good one, can only be addressed if the circumstances of the perceptual episode are known. Indeed, 
as we will see, there may be good cases in which what you see does not exist, and bad ones in 
which it does. This is because, for Anscombe, the goodness or badness of perception is not 
 
14 While Howard Robinson is one of the few theorists to discuss ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’ in any detail, in his 
Perception, pp. 167-172, his reconstruction of Anscombe’s argument is striking in eliding completely the first person 
pronoun. This suggests he does not recognise that for Anscombe the question ‘What do you see?’ and its answer ‘I 
see x’ are essential to identifying the intentional object of sight. It suggests too that he does not appreciate that when 
a perceiver reports what they see, the description they give can be either intentional or material depending on their 
use of the verb ‘to see’.  
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exhausted by the epistemic distinction, veridical/non-veridical, but can accommodate a practical 
or ethical evaluation.  
 
We can approach (though only approach) this bold point – more work will be needed elsewhere - 
by considering a complaint against Anscombe made by Travis (2013), one that will have purchase 
with many contemporary philosophers of perception. Travis objects that ‘see’ is a success verb; as 
such there is no use of the kind described in 3.P. This objection is an opportunity to make explicit 
a feature of Anscombe’s account that might be read as a kind of proto-disjunctivism.  
 
We have stressed that verbs of sensation are intentional – that is, any intelligible use of these verbs 
implies an intentional object (even if the use itself is merely material). However, when we consider 
the language-game in which the question ‘What do you see?’ has its home, we should recognise 
that the point of that language-game – the point of our talk of what we see – is to communicate 
about our shared, publicly perceivable world. As such, the most usual use of a sensation verb is its 
material use. The purely intentional use of the verb ‘to see’ is one that, as we might put it, is a 
development from that more primitive language-game characterised by the question ‘What do you 
see?’ where the expected answer is a description of a joint object of perception.  
 
The idea that our use of the verb ‘to see’ contains these layers of sophistication is not a feature 
special to perception, but a feature of the idea of a practice. When a practice is complex – as human 
practices invariably are – we should also expect that a learner’s grasp of the practice to deepen 
over time as she comes to ‘get the hang of’ the practice insofar as she needs to. And learners will 
also naturally differ in their competencies and interests. What one must grasp in order to join in a 
game of rugby in the park falls far short of the sort of the understanding of that game that is 
possessed by a professional player who has dedicated herself to participating the sport, and who 
structures her life – her diet, exercise, sleep patterns, relationships, leisure – around its demands. 
Similarly, sensitivity to the structures of a linguistic practice can develop and deepen over time, 
along with one’s grasp of the concepts and words that shape those practices. We start by teaching 
a child the material use of the verb to see – a use the mastery of which is the use of the intentional 
verb ‘to see’. Later, she will learn to talk about cases where things ‘seem’ or only ‘look’ a certain 
way, or cases where things do not look as they are; we may begin to offer comparisons things 
‘looking the same’ or ‘looking different’. Now she learns the merely intentional and merely material 
uses.  If she becomes a painter or an ophthalmologist or a magician, her mastery of some areas of 
this practice will deepen. (If she becomes a philosopher, she will need to acquire terms with which 
to describe those specialisms: the term ‘object of sight’ will be among them.) 
 
How our concepts of sensation are elaborated and deepened then depends on our ‘getting the 
hang of’ certain patterns of inference and enquiry, patterns, which are mediated and augmented in 
all sorts of ways by essentially perceptible artefacts, artefacts that are designed to be perceived and 
even contemplated, as well as by perceptual media of various degrees of technological complexity.  
Ophthalmologists test our eyes by asking if we can discern shapes against backgrounds and their 
locations. When I say ‘I see a red line to the left of a green one’ the doctor does not correct me: 
‘No you don’t, the green is to the left of the red!’. We have critical practices around shared 
experience of artworks or designed artefacts or items of personal style – we may discuss and offer 
justification of what we can see and evaluate what things look like. A full philosophical description 
of the grammar of sensation will account for all of these forms and the practices that produce 
them and that they produce.  
 
As will now be clear, ‘asymmetry’ in application of the verb ‘to see’ – the fact the purely intentional 
use of the verb is learnt after the material use – is not the asymmetry the disjunctivist had in mind. 
Further, Anscombe’s priority of material over merely intentional uses of the verb ‘to see’ does not 
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attribute goodness and badness to individual perceptual experiences depending on whether they 
do or do not represent or present features of the environment. My report ‘I see a red line to the 
left of a green one’ need not be a bad case, even though there is no red line to the left of the green 
one – this is seen from the context. But it should now be clear too that there is nothing in 3.P, nor 
in this refusal to employ only an epistemic notion of ‘goodness’, that threatens the fact that, in the 
normal case, ‘see’ is a success verb after all. Travis seems to suppose that because, for Anscombe, 
the verb ‘to see’ can have purely intentional uses, this precludes a conception of perception 
whereby perception is, after all, ‘a way of providing acquaintance with that which can be 
represented, truly or falsely, as being such-and-such ways’. Yet on Anscombe’s view, many sincere 
expressions of visual self-consciousness are neither intended to be nor should be treated as attempts 
to provide a material object of sight. And this is the case, even though the possibility of such uses 
depends on shared linguistic practice begins from the material use of the verb. So, what should we say 
about such sincere expressions that are so intended (that is, that are attempts to give a material 
object of sight) but which miss their mark? Are they then bad? Again, Anscombe’s position draws 
us back to the particular circumstances in which what is seen is seen – and allows for some 
manoeuvre.  
 
To bring this out, consider Travis on the experience of a person suffering an hallucination: 
  
 Of course, someone who suffers hallucinations (a schizophrenic, say) may be said to ‘see’ 
 things that are not there. But here, I think, scare-quotes are important. You may ‘see’ 
 ghosts, or lions in the kitchen, when there are none. The problem then is that you are 
 ‘seeing’ things which are not there to be seen; that is, not seeing anything (p.58).  
 
Of course, where a person who is hallucinating reports seeing lions in the kitchen and her intended 
use is material, it is true that there is no material object of sight – this is just what we mean when 
we speak, ordinarily, of an hallucination. But the grammatical framework provided by Anscombe 
allows us to say much more about the situation, about what may be going wrong or right, and 
about how we might respond in the circumstance. 
 
So as not to foreclose an investigation, let us dispense with the loaded term ‘hallucination’ and 
with the psychiatric diagnosis. Instead, picture a familiar case in which a young child with a rich 
imagination insists ‘I see lions in the kitchen’ (her imaginary pet lions perhaps) or ‘I see ghosts 
under my bed’. On the grammatical approach to perception, the philosopher’s engagement with 
the case does not end with the diagnosis that the sensation verb has no application because no 
lions or ghosts are there to be seen. It does not end with the diagnosis that what we have here is 
the ‘bad case’ – bad because it is on the wrong side of the disjunct that has phenomenally 
indistinguishable veridical perception on the other. Rather, we can go on to ask how this use of 
the verb ‘to see’ fits into the pattern of use that has at its centre cases which involve shared visual 
experience with others.  This returns us too to the import of Anscombe’s interrogative mode. The 
parent might seriously query ‘And what do you see now?’ – here deploying the intentional use. She 
might offer gentle reminders: there are no ghosts, you are not seeing ghosts – now with the material 
use in mind. And perhaps the child even might come to say ‘I am not seeing ghosts’ even while 
she ‘sees ghosts’, as a way of trying to reassure herself and bring herself back into a shared visual 
experience with others. Or, the parent may wish to encourage and foster her child’s imaginative 
capacities – she may provide her with paint and paper and ask her to paint the lions so that she 
might see them too. 
 
This brief discussion of purely intentional uses of the verb to shows up one way in which the 
disjunctivist’s purely epistemic use of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases can lead us away from attending to 
the richness of our perceptual language game, and the concrete circumstances in which perceptual 
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experience takes place. Note how very different things are in the opthamologist’s surgery to in the 
painter’s study or the child’s nursery. These differences are part of the structure that is Anscombe’s 
topic. Wholly intentional uses can be fully accommodated in the weft and weave of mature human 
practice.  
 
We end, then, by reflecting on the ethical dimension of our perceptual practices, a dimension that 
can now be brought into view. What then could be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ case, by Anscombe’s lights? 
Since this large question will take us too far from concluding, we close with only a sketch, one that 
brings Anscombe into conversation with her onetime interlocutor: Iris Murdoch. 
 
In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, G. E. M. Anscombe writes:  
 
It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; … it should be laid aside until 
we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking 
(p.169).  
 
The question of how Anscombe’s account of intention provides the sort of philosophy of 
psychology she sees as necessary before work on ethics can begin has been much debated. This is 
natural given a modern tendency to take the subject matter of moral philosophy to be overt 
intentional action. However, it is well-known that the Aristotelian ethics Anscombe advocates in 
that paper has at its centre the idea that the virtuous person will not just act differently but she will 
see differently. Her actions are good and, to borrow a way of framing things associated more with 
Iris Murdoch, her vision is just. But these two aspects of her character are not accidentally 
connected.  
 
Anscombe’s later work distinguishes theoretical from practical truth.15 Roughly, an action that 
possesses practical truth or, better, is practically true is one the goodness of which derives from, 
or is, inherited by the goodness of its ends.16 Seeing fits into this pattern. Where one’s ends are not 
good, by whatever objective standard one appeals to here, the episodes of seeing and of perceptual 
activity that are directed toward that end, however indirectly, are not good either. Murdoch’s moral 
psychology explores in great detail what might be called the fallen nature of our sight – we are 
biased and prejudiced; we overlook what is there to see; the descriptions under which we see what 
is there to be seen are often unjust; her treatment of the case of M&D in ‘The Idea of Perfection’ 
is her central case. But she also makes room for the possibility of a change in, and ultimately, the 
perfectability of vision, a task which she sees as endless. 
 
What perfectability of vision could amount to in Anscombe’s moral psychology, and what the 
possibility of perfectability requires, is a difficult question that does not have a place here. What 
we can say is this. Sight is a capacity that belongs to a human animal living with others in a material 
world of institutions and practices, many of which, for Anscombe – even notoriously - are corrupt. 
Accordingly, for the Anscombian theorist, illusion cannot be thought of merely as matter of some 
introspectable this being unmoored from any worldly causes or things. Rather it concerns the 
nature of the circumstances - material, natural, intersubjective and epistemic - in which the 
perceiving animal finds herself and the conduciveness of those circumstances to human life going 
well; matters that, on the face of it, seem distant from the philosopher’s tug-of-war. 
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